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Abstract
As of today, TLS is the most commonly used protocol to
protect communication content. To provide good security,
it is of central importance, that administrators know how to
configure their services correctly. For this purpose, services
like, e.g., Qualys SSL Server Test can be leveraged to test
the correctness of a given web server configuration. We
analyzed the utilization of this service over a period of 2.5
months and found two major usage-patterns. In addition,
there is a relation between the number of test-runs and the
resulting quality (i.e., security) of a TLS configuration.
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Introduction
One of today’s most relevant cryptographic protocols is
Transport Layer Security (TLS). It provides communication
security by symmetrically encrypting the data between two
parties that have access to a shared secret which is gener-
ated at the beginning of a conversation. TLS is widely used
in applications that provide secure communication over the
internet. For example, web browsers, email, smartphone
applications and the more recent class of smart home de-
vices (e.g., Amazon Alexa) rely on the security of correct
TLS configurations. However, recent studies on TLS [2, 4]
show, that many endpoints are vulnerable to publicly known
attacks like “Heartbleed”1 or “DROWN” [1]. In addition, es-
pecially web servers are often poorly configured and allow
for Man-in-the-Middle attacks [3].
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Figure 1: The distribution of the
most used top level domains in our
sample
Fahl et al. [3] found that webmasters often lack a detailed
understanding of TLS which results in insecure and vul-
nerable communication channels. A recent lab experiment
related to the configuration process of TLS (i.e., enabling
HTTPS) [5] confirmed, that even experienced users have
problems to execute the configuration task in the most se-
cure way. Krombholz et al. [5] reported poor usability as
the main reason for weak configuration results. While this
is a important finding as it indicates that administrators, and
thus the security of a TLS configuration, would benefit from
more usable processes, the researchers excluded impor-
tant real-world aspects. Most importantly, the evaluation
was based on a short-term lab experiment and focused on
the initial deployment process of a HTTPS-enabled web
server configuration and thus, excluded long-term mainte-
nance tasks, such as certificate renewal and the administra-
tors’ reactions to newly discovered vulnerabilities.
In contrast to this previous work, we analyzed real TLS se-
curity test results provided by the web service Qualys2 and
propose to use this data for a complementary research ap-
proach. Qualys is a web service which assesses the vul-
nerability of a TLS server configuration through grades from
A to F. We argue that analyzing such data can provide im-
portant insights into real-world problems concerning TLS
1https://heartbleed.com
2https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/
configurations and can be used to confirm or question pre-
vious knowledge gained from lab studies and self-reports.
Over a time span of 2.5 months, we collected 445,187 test
results from 144,292 unique domains. We identified two
usage patterns: the Initial Configuration and Reoccurring
Checks. Regarding the number of tests, we observed that
the grades are increasing when more tests are done. In
summary, this paper provides preliminary real-world in-
sights into the difficult task of configuring TLS and indicates
that more usable concepts are needed. In addition, we con-
firm previous findings which found that expert users are
often unable to decide on the appropriate level of security.
Our results highlight the need for more usable configuration
processes and feasible support in decision making.
Approach
To collect real-world data, we used one of the most popular
online service for SSL testing from Qualys SSL Labs. We
specifically focused on the Recently Seen, the Recent best
and the Recent worst grades which were shown on the ser-
vices’ front page. We wrote a python script that visited the
site every five seconds3 , extracted the domains with their
related grades and stored them in a database. We collected
data from September, 29th 2017 to December 14th, 2017,
a time period of about 2.5 months (77 days). Overall, we
analyzed 269,097 tests from 143,660 unique domains.
Qualys Rating Scale
Qualys scoring is a mix of three categories which influence
the security of a servers’ TLS configuration. According to
Qualys, the final grade is calculated based on the following
aspects:
3During the development phase, five seconds was found to be optimal
for our purpose.
• Protocol support (30%): Depending on the supported
protocols (SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS
1.2) the grade is defined by the weakest one avail-
able.
• Key exchange (30%): Based on the parameters at
key exchange (e.g. key length).
• Cipher strength (40%): Qualys scores the length of
the used cipher.
Sessions Occurrences
1 132,396
2 7,399
3 1,950
4 826
5 386
≥6 669
Total 143,626
Table 1: Number of clustered
testing sessions per domain
Grade Total Percentage
A+ (6) 17,427 14.5%
A (5) 50,630 42.0%
A- (4) 11,976 10.0%
B (3) 14,759 12.2%
C (2) 9,152 7.6%
F (1) 10,047 8.3%
T (0) 6,550 5.4%
Total 120.541
Table 2: The distribution of the last
grade we observed for each
domain
The combination of these three categories results in a final
score from 0 to 100, that gets translated in a grade from A+
to F. More details about the used scoring rules (e.g., the
differences of A+, A and A-) are available online4.
Preliminary Results
Even though our observation was limited to 77 days and
thus represents a snap shot of the real world, we are confi-
dent that the data is suited to inform our research question.
Fahl et al. [3] observed that 13.6% of all servers triggered a
warning in the users’ browser. Our data confirms this find-
ing as 13.7% of all servers were graded with F or T, repre-
senting a very weak configuration (e.g., use a broken cipher
like RC4, a key length of 512 and SSL 2 enabled) and a
non-trusted certificate. Such configurations usually trig-
ger warning messages in modern web browsers. In addi-
tion, the Top-Level-Domain (TLD) distribution of our dataset
matches the overall distribution as compared to publicly
available W3Techs data 5 (see figure 1).
4https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-Server-Rating-Guide
– accessed: 05/24/2018
5https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/top_level_domain/all
– accessed: 05/24/2018
Usage
In 77 days, we observed 269,097 tests from 143,660 do-
mains. The average number of tests per domain was µ =
1.87 (σ = 32.86,min = 1,max = 6, 857). Since
a small number of domains was responsible for a large
number of tests, we opted to sanitize the data by focus-
ing on the domains whose test count was in the interval
of [0, µ + 3σ = 160]. This way, 34 domains were identi-
fied as outliers and excluded from the analyses. The final
data set comprised 143,626 domains and 219,877 tests
(µ = 1.53, σ = 2.53 tests per domain).
We grouped multiple consecutive tests into the same Test
Session. As previous lab experiments reported configura-
tion sessions of four hours [5], a session was defined as
closed whenever we did not observe a test within four hours
after the last test had been logged. Table 1 shows the num-
ber of sessions we observed and their corresponding occur-
rences. It shows that the vast majority of users performed
just one test session within the given time frame of 77 days.
Initial Configuration
Initial Configurations are defined as the first occurrence of a
domain in the data set having at least two checks. We set a
minimum of two checks as we were interested in evaluating
iterative configuration processes. We assume that this data
represents the process where an administrator tests the
server multiple times until she is satisfied with the resulting
grade and the properties of the configuration.
The vast majority - 132,396 (92.18%) - just tested once in
their first appearing four-hour-time-interval, indicating no
iterative process. In the remaining 11,225 initial phases, we
observed 2.97 (σ = 1.72) tests on average, meaning that
most people checked their server configuration three times
before seeing their task finished or giving up. The maximum
of performed checks within a test session was 25.
Reoccurring Checks
In addition, we found that some administrators use the
Qualys service more frequently over longer periods of time.
For example, one domain checked its configuration approx-
imately every 2-5 minutes resulting in 6,857 checks within
2.5 months (~90 tests/day). Table 1 gives more details.
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Figure 2: Grade Distribution
compared to the number of checks
done with Qualys SSL Test
Grade Distribution
To get insights into the overall distribution of the final grades,
we focused on the last observed grade domains that were
successfully tested at least twice6. Overall, we logged 120.541
successfully performed tests. Table 2 shows the distribution
of the grades. The average of all “final” ratings is close to A-
(3.97) with a σ of 1.75.
Grade changes
Figure 2 shows that with an increasing number of tests the
proportion of all A grades rises from 64% concerning two
tests to nearly 75% with six tests. This indicates that admin-
istrators tend to test and reconfigure their servers multiple
times to achieve good security and tools like Qualys can
support them in doing so.
Discussion
In the following, we discuss the implications of our prelimi-
nary findings.
Securing TLS Configurations Takes Time
Hardening TLS Configurations is an iterative process. Our
analysis shows that the resulting TLS grade and thus, the
servers’ security is improving with the number of tests. This
indicates that short-term lab studies might oversee some
aspects when testing the ability of administrators to config-
ure and harden a service that uses TLS as administrators
6Qualys’ test sometimes fails (e.g. due to “Certificate name mis-
match”) and requires a manual restart of the test process.
often follow a trial and error approach and secure configura-
tions may take several hours.
Not All Services Achieve Best Grades
Despite the fact that Qualys suggests improvements that
can be done to harden the security of a configuration, we
found that more than 21% of all logged domains finished
their last test with a grade of C or worse. To get more in-
sights into the reasons for this real-world behavior, future
studies should collect qualitative feedback to analyze why
some administrators seem satisfied with bad grades.
Only a Small Subset of Webservices Make Use of Qualys
The number of all publicly known active websites7 in com-
bination with Let’s Encrypt ’s statistics8 indicates that there
are nearly 115 million domains using TLS. We observed
tests by only 0.12% of these websites. Even though we
assume that the number of administrators who use ser-
vices like Qualys is much higher than observed, we still
conclude that a minority of HTTPS-enabled web servers
is actively tested and that the security of such services is
seldom monitored.
Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper we proposed to analyze Qualys SSL Server
Test results as a new information vector to understand the
problems of the TLS configuration process. In the future
we plan to combine our quantitative data with qualitative
feedback by contacting some of the observed web services
directly. Finally, it would be interesting to observe and ana-
lyze testing behaviour whenever new TLS vulnerabilities like
DROWN are found and publicly discussed.
7https://www.netcraft.com/active-sites/ – accessed: 05/24/2018
8https://letsencrypt.org/stats/ – accessed: 05/24/2018
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